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 10 Shiseido Marketing in China 
10.1  Introduction 
 Shiseido is a leading Japanese cosmetics manufacturer that has been in operation for 
more than a century. With growth in domestic and international markets, specially 
those of emerging nations such as China, international development within the cos-
metics industry is growing in importance. In Shiseido’s mid-term management plan 
covering the 3 years between 2011 and 2013, the company continued to strive 
toward its goal of being a “global player representing Asia with its origins in Japan.” 
The company outlined four growth strategies: the “global megabrand” strategy, the 
“Asia breakthrough” strategy, the “new frontier” strategy, and the “customer fi rst” 
strategy. These strategies state that China’s market will receive top priority as engine 
of growth, where signifi cant management resources will be invested. 
 Shiseido set shop in China in 1981, upon request from the Beijing government, 
the time at which it began a partnership with a local company. Shiseido has a longer 
history in China’s cosmetics market than any other foreign fi rm. Under the leader-
ship of the company’s current honorary chairman, Yoshiharu Fukuhara (he was 
head of the international division in 1981 at the time of its entrance into China), 
Shiseido set up a joint venture (JV) in 1991 and established the “Aupres” brand, 
developed exclusively for sale in China, as one of the top brands in the market. The 
global brand “Seseido,” the “ZA” brand targeting a younger audience, and the 
“Uno” brand for men are high selling brands, thus establishing the business in China 
as a source of growth for Shiseido on the whole. 
 However, the Chinese market is under the radar of every cosmetic company 
worldwide, and competition in the country is intensifying. Apart from traditional 
department store channels, specialty shops, drugstores, and other cosmetics distri-
bution channels are becoming more broadly available, making it necessary to mar-
ket to a wider clientele. In addition, Shiseido is quality-oriented, establishing itself 
as a highly reliable brand. However, maintaining this brand name necessitates not 
only consideration for product safety but also preservation of relationships with the 
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Chinese government through strict compliance to its regulations and aggressive 
CSR activities. 
 Shiseido continues to explore new operating strategies in China to strengthen its 
brand within the market and transition itself from a Japanese cosmetics manufac-
turer into a global player representing Asia, including China. 
10.2  Corporate Timeline and Overview 
 Shiseido’s founder, Arinobu Fukuhara, was a chief pharmacist in a naval hospital. 
He aimed toward the practical application of the pharmaceutical system in Japan, a 
country where in 1872, Chinese herbal medicine was still very much the norm. 
Fukuhara began Shiseido as a western-style pharmacy, the fi rst in Japan. The name 
“Shiseido” originates from a phrase in the Chinese classic text  I Ching : “Zhì zāi kūn 
yuán, wàn wùzī shēng” (“How wonderful is the virtue of the land! All things are 
born here.” The fi nal two characters, “zī shēng,” are pronounced “shisei” in Japanese 
and mean “born here”). In 1888, Shiseido launched the sale of Japan’s fi rst tooth-
paste. This paste, at the time, was eight times more expensive than abrasive powders 
for cleaning teeth, but nevertheless was popular because of its ability to remove 
stains on teeth and alleviate bad breath. In 1915, Fukuhara’s third son, Shinzo, an 
experienced photographer, took over the company, beginning Shiseido’s foray into 
cosmetics, launching “Eudermin” in the market. Eudermin, a product that is sold 
even today, is a scientifi cally derived facial lotion based on western medicine. 
Shiseido has strived to develop products of scientifi cally high quality, even within 
its cosmetic products lineup, comparable to pharmaceuticals. 
 One of Shinzo Fukuhara’s favorite sayings was “let the products do all the talk-
ing.” To that end, he put his best efforts into product names, containers, and packag-
ing, which evoked the “product.” The camellia fl ower trademark used by Shiseido 
for more than 120 years was designed by Shinzo himself. The fi rst Miss Shiseido, 
the predecessor to today’s in-store beauty consultants (“BCs” as they are popularly 
known) who help customers with beauty-related issues, debuted in 1934 (Table  10.1 )
 From the post-war period through the fi rst half of the 1980s, a time of high eco-
nomic growth, Shiseido experienced soaring sales in its domestic market. This 
strong growth is attributed to its business model, which consisted of voluntary chain 
stores built over a resale system in which stores were obligated to sell products in 
their retail stores at set prices. However, the bursting of the economic bubble in the 
latter half of the 1980s began a long period of stagnation for the company, coincid-
ing with further diversifi cation of consumer preferences, buying patterns, sales 
channels, and pricing. In addition, the resale system for cosmetics was abolished in 
1997, kicking off a price war. In an attempt to boost fl agging sales, Shiseido consis-
tently introduced new brands and products into the market, diluting its sales efforts 
and beginning a vicious cycle of introducing numerous new products, dispersing 
marketing investments, reducing the power of their brand, and experiencing poor 
sales. The company then attempted to limit the number of brands, but with stagnant 
unit sales, competition in the Japanese market became fi ercer and business remained 
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 Table 10.1  Development of Shiseido Company Ltd. 
 Date  Events 
 September 1872  “Shiseido Pharmacy” established in Tokyo’s Ginza district 
 September 1915  Camellia fl ower selected as corporate trademark 
 December 1923  Creation of the chain store system 
 January 1937  Launch of Shiseido’s “Camellia Club” 
 September 1939  Completion of Shiseido Chemistry Research Laboratories (subsequently, 
the Number 1 Research Center, followed by the Shiseido Research Center 
in Shin-Yokohama) 
 May 1949  Listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
 June 1957  Creation of Taiwan Shiseido Co., Ltd. (manufacturing began April of 
following year) 
 October 1959  Creation of Shiseido Trading Co., Ltd. (which changed its name to 
Shiseido Fine Toiletry Co., Ltd., and later merged with FT Shiseido Co., 
Ltd.) 
 August 1965  Creation of Shiseido Cosmetics (US), later consolidating with Shiseido 
International Corporation and currently known as Shiseido Americas 
Corporation 
 August 1968  Creation of Shiseido Cometici (Italy) 
 July 1980  Creation of Shiseido Deutschland and Shiseido France 
 February 1986  Acquisition of France’s CARITA 
 August 1988  Creation of Shiseido International Corporation, now known as Shiseido 
Americas Corporation 
 September 1988  Acquisition of US’ Zotos 
 January 1990  Creation of Shiseido America Incorporated 
 October 1990  Creation of Beauté Prestige International in France 
 October 1991  Completion of Gien Factory in France 
 November 1991  Creation of Shiseido Cosmenity Co., Ltd. (currently, “Shiseido Fitit”) 
 December 1991  Creation of Shiseido Liyuan Cosmetics Co., Ltd., a joint venture with 
Beijing Liyuan Co., Ltd. 
 July 1992  Completion of the Number 2 Research Center (currently Shiseido Research 
Center (Kanazawa Hakkei)) 
 April 1995  Consolidation of 15 sales companies into Shiseido Cosmetics Sales Co., 
Ltd. (now operating as Shiseido Sales Co., Ltd.) 
 December 1995  Creation of Shiseido International Co., Ltd. 
 December 1996  Acquisition of Helene Curtis’s North America Professional Division 
 February 1998  Creation of joint venture, Shanghai Zotos Citic Cosmetics Co., Ltd. 
 September 1998  Creation of joint venture, Shiseido Dah Chong Hong Cosmetics Co., Ltd. 
 May 2000  Purchase of majority control of Laboratories Decleor S.A.S. in France 
 Acquisition of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s “Sea Breeze” brand 
 Acquisition of “NARS” brand in the US 
 June 2000  Completion of the new Research Center (Shin-Yokohama) 
 October 2000  Creation of FT Shiseido Co., Ltd., transferring toiletry business to it from 
Shiseido Co., Ltd. 
(continued)
10.2 Corporate Timeline and Overview
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sluggish because of a further decline in sale prices. In an effort to break out of this 
long period of slow growth, management reforms were put in place at the beginning 
of 2005 to expand overseas profi ts and create a post-resale domestic business model. 
In addition to securing a double-digit revenue growth overseas led by China, the 
company also greatly improved its profi tability by disposing unprofi table 
divisions. 
 However, the latter half of the 2000s witnessed a stronger impact of new domes-
tic distribution channels, such as drugstores and internet shopping, leaving Shiseido 
to fi ght diffi cult battles because of its dependence on department stores and spe-
cialty shops. In April 2012, Shiseido began a new marketing campaign that com-
bined its traditional strength of in-store beauty consultants with information offered 
via the web to individual customers by creating a special web page “ Watashi +.” As 
domestic sales weakened, overseas sales became more important because revenues 
in Asia and Oceania regions, particularly China, were increasing (Tables  10.2 and 
 10.3 ).
 As of March 2012, the Shiseido group had 94 consolidated subsidiaries globally. 
The company’s businesses cover manufacturing and sale of cosmetics, cosmetics 
tools, toiletries, hair and beauty products, beauty foods, and pharmaceuticals, as 
well as research and other services for each of the businesses (Table  10.4 ).
10.3  Shiseido’s Global Business 
 Shiseido began its global operations in 1957 with sales of cosmetics in Taiwan. At 
the time, importing of cosmetics was banned in Taiwan; therefore, Shiseido began 
local production. In 1957, Shiseido Taiwan’s marketing strategy was a system of 
chain stores with in-store beauty instruction, because the company realized an inad-
equate cosmetic-related knowledge among consumers in the country. Later, Shiseido 
Table 10.1 (continued)
 Date  Events 
 May 2003  Headquarters moved to Shiodome offi ce (in Tokyo’s Minato-ku) 
 December 2003  Creation of Shiseido (China) Investment Co., Ltd. in Shanghai 
 March 2006  Closing of factories in Maizuru and Itabashi (consolidating six 
manufacturing sites into four) 
 May 2006  Transfer of sanitary products business to Unicharm Group 
 May 2007  Creation of Shiseido Russia wholly owned subsidiary 
 April 2008  Creation of Shiseido Vietnam wholly owned manufacturing company 
 July 2008  Creation of Shiseido Business Solution Co., Ltd. 
 March 2009  Dissolution of Shiseido Boutique Co., Ltd. and Beauty Technology Co., 
Ltd. 
 March 2009  Withdrawal from Boutique business 
 January 2010  Agreement to acquire Bare Escentuals in the US 
 Source : Various reference materials 
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 Table 10.2  Shiseido’s revenue by division and region (units: in JPY 100 million) 
 2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
 Total  7,235  6,903  6,442  6,707  6,824 
 Domestic cosmetic:  4,239  3,976  3,838  3,584  3,538 
 Global  2,788  2,757  2,504  3,026  3,197 
 Other  208  170  100  97  89 
 Overseas 
 Japan  4,607  4,300  4,081  3,838  3,813 
 US  566  507  457  855  822 
 Europe  1,038  1,000  824  843  905 
 Asia/Oceania  1,024  1,096  1,080  1,171  1,297 
 Source : 2012 Shiseido annual report 
 Table 10.3  Shiseido’s operating margin by division and region 
 2007 (%)  2008 (%)  2009 (%)  2010 (%)  2011 (%) 
 Total  8.8  7.2  7.8  6.6  5.7 
 Domestic cosmetic  10.1  8.1  10.1  9.3  8.3 
 Global  6.3  5.5  3.8  3.0  2.6 
 Other  4.8  5.1  10.5  11.4  9.9 
 Overseas 
 Japan  6.5  4.0  5.6  4.1  3.0 
 US  6.1  5.6  6.0  1.6  5.0 
 Europe  8.3  7.8  6.5  7.2  5.5 
 Asia/Oceania  15.5  15.3  13.9  14.3  11.4 
 Source : 2012 Shiseido annual report 
 Table 10.4  Shiseido’s major businesses and subsidiaries 




 Cosmetics division (manufacture and sales of 
makeup, makeup tools, and toiletry products) 
 Headquarters 
 Professional division (manufacture and sales of 
hair and beauty products) 
 Shiseido Sales Co., Ltd. 
 Healthcare division (manufacture and sales of 
beauty food products and general medical supplies) 
 Shiseido Fitit Co., Ltd. 
 Other (manufacture and sales of domestic 
OEM products and catalog sales products) 
 Shiseido International 
Co., Ltd. 
 FT Shiseido Co., Ltd. 
 Shiseido Professional Co., 
Ltd. 
 Shiseido Beauty Salon 
Co., Ltd. 
 Shiseido Medical Co., Ltd. 
 Etc. 
10.3 Shiseido’s Global Business
160
aggressively expanded its sales network into Asia, Europe, and the US under the 
“SHISEIDO” global brand, focusing on its specialty: anti-aging and skin-whitening 
products. 
 Shiseido aims to expand operations in Southeast Asian markets, with a strong-
hold in China. The “SHISEIDO” brand in Taiwan is highly sought-after. In Vietnam, 
Shiseido has been selling skin care and makeup products under the “SHISEIDO” 
Table 10.4 (continued)




 Cosmetics division (manufacture and sales of 
makeup, makeup tools, and toiletry products) 
 Headquarters 
 Professional division (manufacture and sales of 
hair and beauty products) 
 Shiseido America 
Corporation 
 Shiseido America 
Incorporated 
 Zotos International 
Incorporated 
 Shiseido International 
Europe 
 Shiseido International 
France 
 Shiseido Deutscheland 
 Shiseido Cometici (Italy) 
 Shiseido Europe 
 Beauté Prestige 
International 
 Laboratories Decleor 
S.A.S. 
 Shiseido (China) 
 Investments Co., Ltd. 
 Shanghai Zotos Citic 
 Cosmetics Co., Ltd. 
 Shiseido Liyuan 
Cosmetics Co., Ltd. 
 Taiwan Shiseido Co., 
 Ltd. 
 Etc. 
 Other  Frontier science division (manufacture and 
sales of cosmetics materials, pharmaceuticals, 
and medical-use cosmetics) 
 Headquarters 
 Other (sales of clothing and fashion 
accessories, beverages, etc.) 
 The Ginza Co., Ltd. 
 Shiseido Parlor Co., Ltd. 
 Etc. 
 Source : 2012 Shiseido annual report 
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brand through agent stores since 1997. In response to growing needs caused by the 
high growth of the cosmetics market, accompanied by dramatic economic growth, 
Shiseido created Shiseido Cosmetics Vietnam Co., Ltd., and began operations in 
January 2010. On the other hand, a JV with the large local manufacturer Amore 
Pacifi c in the 1990s marked the beginning of Shiseido into the Korean market, but 
signifi cantly strong local manufacturers and sales channels for which the general 
merchandising store market was critical, left them at around the 10th place in the 
country. Shiseido is yet to enter the Indian market in earnest, though they do have 
imported products for sale in luxury hotels and department stores via local 
distributors. 
 Although Shiseido has been successful in Asian markets, with the exception of 
Korea, it has fought way more diffi cult battles in the US market. In addition to the 
SHISEIDO brand that they introduced in the US more than 40 years ago, Shiseido 
has aggressively expanded by acquiring other domestic brands such as “Zotos,” 
“ZIRH,” and “NARS.” However, the US market is more price sensitive than the 
Japanese market, and North American operations have suffered losses for several 
years. In 2008, bold structural reforms, such as consolidation and elimination of US 
subsidiaries, reduced the losses. Nevertheless, business again became sluggish 
because of the impact of the global economic crisis caused by the crash in the fi nan-
cial markets. Shiseido acquired Bare Escentuals, a natural cosmetics manufacturer 
in the US, to rally its US business, and is expanding globally with Bare Escentuals’ 
“Bare Mineral” as a global strategic brand. 
 Shiseido began cosmetics sales in Europe with its 1968 entry into the Italian 
market. It entered the French market in 1980 through a JV with Pierre Fabre. France 
is, of course, the center of the fashion, cosmetics, and perfume industries, and is the 
source of the most up-to-date beauty information in the world. This meant that if 
Shiseido could be successful in the French market, the country in which top brands 
vie for business, it would be recognized in cosmetics markets throughout the world. 
In Europe, fragrances command approximately 30–40 % of the overall cosmetics 
market. However, this was a completely new arena for Shiseido at the time. Shiseido 
built a foundation there, in the heart of the fragrance industry, and is now beginning 
to attract the attention of the world’s perfume industry through collaborations with 
leading designers, image consultants, perfumers, and marketing directors. To 
respond to the uniqueness of the French market and successfully enter local mar-
kets, Shiseido created a subsidiary for a fragrance brand in France, “Beauté Prestige 
International,” and has recently implemented a strategy to make its entrance into the 
rest of Europe. For example, Shiseido purchased 100 % of Swiss resellers’ outstand-
ing shares to strengthen operations there, and began sales in Switzerland in January 
2010. 
 By capitalizing its overseas operations, overseas sales as of December 2011 
accounted for 44.3 % of overall growth, spanning across 87 countries and regions. 
With 11 overseas factories and seven R&D centers in the US, Europe, China, and 
elsewhere, the company is actively pursuing a path of globalization. 
10.3 Shiseido’s Global Business
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10.4  China’s Cosmetics Market and Shiseido’s China 
Expansion 
 The central theme of Shiseido’s global strategy is expansion into Asian markets. 
Sales in China, in particular, are of high priority because it is an enormous market 
with high growth expectation. With a population of 1.3 billion and high economic 
growth, China experienced active sales growth in its cosmetics market, growing into 
a formidable one. The world’s leading cosmetics manufacturers have begun produc-
ing cosmetics within China, thereby intensifying competition. Shiseido has per-
formed well in the market despite this competition, and SHISEIDO has gained 
popularity as Chinese women have become more fashion conscious. 
 In sync with China’s reforms aimed at opening the country, the Chinese cosmet-
ics industry has grown rapidly since the 1990s, continuing to experience double- 
digit annual growth to this day. In 1990, the size of the Chinese cosmetics market 
was a mere CNY four billion, as opposed to its 2011 growth of almost 30 times, at 
CNY 112.2 billion (Yano Research Institute ( 2012 )). Japan’s cosmetics market in 
2010 was approximately JPY 1.5 trillion, and it can be said that China is soon 
approaching this level. In addition, skin and hair care products are its major product 
lines, similar to Japan. Unlike European and US markets, makeup and fragrance 
products have a smaller share in the market, but are said to be the future engines for 
growth in the Chinese cosmetics market. 
 Shiseido’s entrance into the Chinese market goes back to 1981, when it sold 
imported products in ultra-luxury department stores and hotels after approval by the 
Beijing government. In 1983, with the fi nalization of the First Technology 
Cooperation Agreement with the Beijing government, Shiseido began production of 
the “Hau Zi” series of shampoo and conditioner products. Through this collabora-
tion, Shiseido built a relationship of mutual trust with the Beijing government, 
resulting in the 1991 JV with the Beijing Liyuan Co., Ltd., through a request by the 
Beijing government, thus creating Shiseido Liyuan Cosmetics Co., Ltd. (SLC), with 
Shiseido Shiseido (China) Investments Co., Ltd., and Beijing Liyuan Co., Ltd. own-
ing 40, 25, and 35 %, respectively, penetrating the Chinese market. At the time, 
cosmetics in China were sold by weight; however, Haruyoshi Fukuhara, the presi-
dent of Shiseido at the time, unilaterally determined that the formation of the JV 
was the right thing to do. When the JV began in 1991, the domestically produced 
high-end cosmetics market was non-existent, and so Shiseido explored methodi-
cally the positioning of the cosmetics made by SLC within the market. Thus, the 
brand name of “AUPRES,” which had European connotations was set, and, as a way 
to ensure identifi cation of product quality as a result of Japan’s superior manufactur-
ing technology, “by SHISEIDO” was tacked onto the name. While the quality of 
these products was comparable to that of imported foreign brands, the prices were 
set at CNY 80–100, lower than the average CNY 200 of the imported goods. 
Cosmetics by local manufacturers at the time were sold at CNY 10–20, thus having 
concerns about its prices being too high. However, they stood fi rm, believing in the 
importance of its high-end brand strategy (Table  10.5 ).
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 Yu Okazawa, who guided interactions with the Beijing government during two 
assignments in China during the 1980s and 1990s, and who boosted marketing for 
AUPRES, remarked, “We constantly faked stoicism for the sake of our pride in 
those early years.” The company carefully researched high-end department store 
locations and customer demographics in an effort to make AUPRES the number one 
brand in cosmetic sales, only expanding its channels in a limited fashion. From 
these efforts, AUPRES became the top-selling brand at Yaohan, a department store 
catering to foreigners, and the products’ increasingly strong reputation led to many 
inquiries from retail stores. However, the company focused on gaining top market 
share within their used channels, and thus put off short-term retail expansion, taking 
pains to ensure the products’ establishment as a high-end brand. Okazawa also 
remarked, “At SLC, we were starting a factory, and would have very much liked to 
increase our points of sale to maintain high factory utilization, but we prioritized 
establishing ourselves as a high-end brand” (from a February  2010 interview). 
AUPRES was designated as the offi cial cosmetic brand of Chinese athletes during 
the 2000 Sydney Olympics as well as the 2004 Athens Olympics, and is currently a 
widely popular brand sold throughout China. 
 While establishing its position in the high-end cosmetics market, Shiseido cre-
ated a JV, Shanghai Zotos Citic Cosmetics Co., Ltd. (SZC), with Shanghai’s CITIC 
 Table 10.5  Development of Shiseido in China 
 1980  Yoshiharu Fukuhara, Intl. Vice President (current honorary chairman) visits China and 
forms effective relationship with Beijing government offi cials 
 1981  Sales of cosmetics, soaps, and toothpaste in Yaohan and other high-end department 
stores and hotels 
 1983  Production technology agreement with Beijing government for haircare products 
 1991  Creation of “Beijing Liyuan Co., Ltd.” joint venture with Liyuan Co., Ltd. (currently 
known as Shiseido Liyuan Cosmetics Co., Ltd.) 
 1994  Production and sales of AUPRES brand made for Chinese market 
 1998  Creation of Shanghai joint venture with CITIC (Shanghai Zotos Citic Cosmetics Co., 
Ltd., “SZC”) 
 2000  Development of Aupres J’s brand of cosmetics for men 
 2001  Creation of Shiseido China Research Center Co., Ltd. (a wholly owned subsidiary 
created inside a Beijing joint venture company) 
 2003  Creation of Shiseido (China) Investments Co., Ltd. in Shanghai 
 2004  Start of chain store business 
 2005  Shiseido China Research Center Co., Ltd. moved to a new stand-alone building 
 2006  Sales of Urara brand, full-scale rollout of chain store business 
 2008  Creation of training centers for beauty consultants 
 Selected as cosmetics sponsor for Shanghai World Expo 
 Creation of Shiseido Life Quality Beauty Center 
 2010  Began selling “DQ” products especially made for drugstores; began professional line 
targeting high-end hair salons 
 2011  30th anniversary of Chinese operations; began “Shiseido Dream Come True Human 
Resources Project” 
 Source : Various reference materials 
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in 1998. This venture aimed to provide products to middle-class consumers. SZC, 
like SLC, began as an entity with both a sales group and a factory to roll out local 
production in China, and began by manufacturing and selling the “Za” brand for the 
Chinese market. Furthermore, SZC’s products did not use the Shiseido name any-
where to avoid damaging Shiseido’s image as a high-end cosmetics brand (note that 
the “S” in SZC stands for “Shanghai,” not “Shiseido”). 
 In 2003, the company created Shiseido China Co., Ltd. as a holding company for 
SLC, SZC, and other companies, and made SCH responsible for sales, while SZC 
specialized in the manufacturing of products for the middle-class market. This was 
made possible with China’s entry into the WTO, allowing foreign fi rms to create 
stand-alone sales companies. Za products were primarily sold in department stores, 
although, in 2004, the company began its specialty store business with the 
“Pure&Mild” product, exclusively made for the Chinese market. In 2006, the com-
pany further developed the “Urara” brand for its specialty stores. Through its spe-
cialty stores, SCH invested in sales efforts of its Za, Pure&Mild, and Urara brands 
without the Shiseido name, while simultaneously marketing SHISEIDO imported 
products in high-end department stores. In 2010, it developed a new brand, “DQ,” 
for sale at drugstores (i.e., stores that sell both cosmetics and pharmaceuticals), a 
distribution channel that was expected to grow in the future. 
 In 2001, Shiseido created Shiseido China Research Center Co., Ltd. (SRC) as a 
wholly owned subsidiary focused on R&D, leveraging the abundant Chinese medi-
cine and beauty methods nurtured over China’s long history. This subsidiary is 
responsible for tasks such as discovering new materials in traditional Chinese herbal 
medicine and application of such materials for product development, researching 
cosmetics awareness and beauty practices among Chinese women, and developing 
products for the Chinese market. As of 2012, Shiseido’s Chinese subsidiaries 
(excluding Hong Kong) included the SCH holding company, with SLC, SZC, and 
SRC falling under it (Fig.  10.1 ). 
 Shiseido also invests heavily in CSR activities within China. Since 2005, the 
company has participated in state projects aimed at “improving the appearance of 
Chinese women” of all ages. Furthermore, Shiseido has supported tree-planting 
projects, the opening of the Hope Elementary School, and artists. Unique to the 
cosmetics industry, it has taught women with bruises, white spots, scars, and other 
Shiseido (China) Co., Ltd.
(SCH)
Shiseido Liyuan Cosmetics Co., 
Ltd. (SLC)
Primary shareholders: Shiseido Group 
(approx. 70%), Beijing Li Yuan Co., 
Ltd. (approx. 30%)
Shanghai Zotos Citic Costmetics Co., 
Ltd. (SZC)
Primary shareholders: Shiseido Group 
(approx. 90%), CITIC Group (approx.
10%)
Shiseido China Research Center 
Co., Ltd. (SRC)
Primary shareholder: Shiseido 
Group
 Fig. 10.1  Structure of Shiseido group companies in China (as of 2012) 
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serious skin troubles how to conceal them with cosmetics. In May 2010, Shiseido 
became the cosmetics industry sponsor of the Shanghai World Expo, the fi rst 
Japanese company to be a sponsor for that exposition. As the cosmetics manufactur-
ers selected by the Shanghai World Expo Coordination Bureau, Shiseido provided 
cosmetics, perfumes, and sunscreen to event personnel as well as instructions on 
makeup application. 
10.5  Marketing Strategy in China 
 Distribution channels for cosmetics can be classifi ed into three groups: department 
stores, specialty stores, and drugstores. Shiseido has implemented a product strat-
egy for each of these channels in China. High-end products such as the “Clé de Peau 
Beauté” or SHISEIDO are imported and sold at high-end department stores. 
AUPRES and its higher-end version SUPREME AUPRES, both made exclusively 
for the Chinese market, are sold in department stores. In addition, there are other 
brands, such as ELIXIR, HAKU, Pure&Mild, and Za, which appeal to a wider 
range of middle, class consumers than the aforementioned prestige brands; they are 
distributed through specialty shops and drugstores (Tables  10.6 and  10.7 )
 The primary battlefi elds for top class imported cosmetics, such as Estée Lauder, 
Christian Dior, Chanel, SK II, and Lancôme, are high-end department stores. 
Shiseido’s products that compete in this space are their global brands Clé de Peau 
Beauté (CPG) and SHISEIDO. The AUPRES category, developed for the Chinese 
market and manufactured in China, is targeted at a marginally lower demographic 
and priced not only for the well-to-do class, but is within reach for professional 
women on a budget. In 2006, Shiseido began to compete with premium products 
from European and US cosmetics manufacturers by selling Supreme Aupres in the 
CNY 180–480 price range at high-end department stores in Shanghai and Beijing. 
 Table 10.6  Shiseido’s brand in China by channel type (as of 2012) 
 Category  Major brands  Distribution channels 
 Department stores  Chain stores  Drug stores 
 High prestige  Clé de Peau Beauté  + 
 Prestige  AUPRES  + 
 SUPREME AUPRES  + 
 Global SHISEIDO  + 
 Middle  ELIXIR SUPERIEUR  + 
 HAKU  + 
 TSUBAKI  +  + 
 Uno  +  + 
 Urara  + 
 Pure&Mild  +  + 
 Za  +  + 
 AQUALABEL  +  + 
 Source : various reference materials 
 Note: DQ is sold in modern drugstores 
10.5 Marketing Strategy in China
166
 AUPRES was originally developed to fi ll the enormous gap between high-end 
imported products and low-end Chinese products. However, with the successive 
entrance of foreign fi rms into the Chinese market, competition intensifi ed with 
products geared more toward the masses than the top class products, such as L’oréal, 
Clinique, and Biotherm. In response, SLC completely redesigned AUPRES in 2008 
to improve its competitiveness by targeting the “80s generation” (segment of the 
population that was born during the 1980s). AUPRES’ new concept was that of the 
“blooming beauty,” or “the inner energy of beauty held by Chinese women that 
would blossom through AUPRES.” To further demonstrate the brand’s exclusivity 
toward Chinese women, the company removed the “by SHISEIDO” logo from 
packaging when the product went on sale. Shiseido also used the consumption hab-
its of the 80s generation by aggressively running promotions, particularly through 
word-of-mouth marketing. Shiseido promoted the strengths of its products through 
the Internet by having product ambassadors with clear, light skin record their opin-
ions after using these products on blogs. Born during China’s “one child” policy, 
most people born in the 80s have grown alongside the spread of the Internet in the 
country. Their values and preferences differ from previous generations, and their 
consumption habits are said to be similar to Japan’s younger generation. They have 
no particular loyalty to luxury brands and value originality. Being very familiar with 
the Internet, their online shopping percentage is higher than that among other age 
groups, relying more on word-of-mouth than traditional commercials. 
 In 2004, Shiseido used its knowhow of specialty stores in Japan to begin a 
Shiseido chain store as its second pillar to the premium product business within 
department stores. Shiseido is currently developing markets in rural and small- and 
medium-sized cities in China’s interior through direct sales by these chain stores. 
The chain store business comprises small retail stores and roadside shops that pri-
marily sell medium-priced products. Shiseido’s agreements with the chain stores 
are reviewed annually, and either side may terminate the agreement, although 
Shiseido aims to build long-term relationships of mutual trust. Shiseido provides 
marketing support and training to sales employees, while the stores are required to 
understand Shiseido’s products to bring its sales to constitute 50 % of the stores’ 
revenues and install point-of-sale terminals in the stores. Starting with an initial 
three stores in 2004, Shiseido expanded at a tremendous pace, with more than 6,000 
stores as of October 2012. In the past, these stores sold products imported from 
Japan as well as the Pure&Mild brand, but began selling Urara in 2006, a chain store 
 Table 10.7  Prices of main products by Shiseido in China (as of 2009, in RMB) 
 Category  Cie de Peau Beaute  Aupres  Urara  Za 
 Eye shadow  650  115–260  75–90  78–88 
 Lipstick  480–550  120–140  55–95  80–88 
 Foundation  700–900  170–240  110–150  68–115 
 Cleansing foam  500  90–135  90  39–78 
 Lotion  820  100–200  130–140  98–128 
 Emulsion  920  105–210  135–150  98–138 
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brand that was made exclusively for Chinese women. Urara is currently a fl agship 
product at the chain stores. 
 China’s distribution channels are becoming more diverse, with channels such as 
superstores, drugstores, and convenience stores. Some drugstores are pharmacies 
with a pharmacist on duty, while others primarily sell toiletries. In the former, 
Drugstores are thought to be a promising distribution channel for cosmetics. For 
example, French Vichy entered the Chinese market in 1998, and currently holds 
contracts with 200 drugstores, through which it markets its products. Shiseido began 
selling the new “DQ” brand at drugstores in 2010 and is working on expanding the 
breadth of its channels. 
10.6  Competition with Western Brands 
 Foreign brands are widely popular in the Chinese market. Foreign cosmetic manu-
facturers have a higher reputation for quality and reliability than domestic manufac-
turers, and foreign manufacturers, primarily P&G, Shiseido, L’oréal, and Estée 
Lauder, are competing for market share. For example, Estée Lauder has introduced 
its MAC and Bobbi Brown brands into the market, and P&G has done likewise with 
its SK II brand. Johnson & Johnson, L’oréal, and Shiseido have all created R&D 
centers in Shanghai. The cosmetics market in China is known to have several local 
brands, but the quality and brand name of those brands is in no comparison to for-
eign brands, leaving Shiseido to compete, for the meanwhile, with global western 
fi rms such as L’oréal, Estée Lauder, and P&G (Tables  10.8 ,  10.9 , and  10.10 ).
 P&G primarily manufactures and sells detergents, toiletries, and cosmetics, and 
is the world’s largest consumer products company. The company entered the 
Chinese market in 1988 with sales of its Rejoy shampoo, and in 1989 with sales of 
its Olay brand skin care products. Rejoy enjoys approximately 40 % market share 
in China’s shampoo market, while mass-market Olay brand cosmetics are among 
the top ten in the Chinese market. 
 Estée Lauder, headquartered in the US, manufactures and sells cosmetics, skin 
care products, hair care products, and perfumes. It entered the Chinese market in 
1993 with its fl agship Estée Lauder and Clinque brands. It primarily imports high- 
end cosmetics. In February 2010, Estée Lauder’s CEO, Fabrizio Freda, remarked, 
“We currently sell in 40 Chinese cities, and are considering the sale of our products 
in 600 cities in the future. We will be making further investments in our skincare 
division, which is our most profi table business.” 
 The L’oréal Group, headquartered in Clichy, France, is the world’s largest cos-
metics company. The company focuses primarily on cosmetics, hair coloring, skin-
care, and perfumes; however, it is also active in the fi elds of dermatology and 
pharmaceuticals. The company entered the Chinese market in 1996, following P&G 
and Estée Lauder, and is rapidly gaining ground by acquiring local fi rms. It is dis-
tinctive in its wide range of products, from its high-end Lancôme cosmetics to the 
mass-market Maybelline brand. In 2003, it acquired the local cosmetics brand “ Yue 
Sai ,” which sold its products in 80 department stores. In 2004, it expanded its 
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 Table 10.8  Profi tability of global cosmetics manufacturers (units: USD million) 
 L’oreal SA  Estee Lauder  P & G  Shiseido 
 Total assets 
 2005  28,180  3,886  61,527  5,698 
 2006  32,676  3,784  135,695  6,265 
 2007  33,920  4,126  138,014  6,785 
 2008  32,009  5,011  143,992  6,142 
 2009  32,375  5,177  134,833  6,173 
 2010  33,422  5,336  128,172  8,335 
 2011  37,332  6,274  138,354  8,902 
 Revenues 
 2005  18,085  6,336  56,741  5,935 
 2006  19,830  6,464  64,416  5,941 
 2007  23,718  7,038  72,441  6,355 
 2008  24,383  7,911  79,257  6,897 
 2009  24,287  7,324  76,694  7,025 
 2010  27,099  7,796  78,938  6,924 
 2011  28,277  8,810  82,559  8,066 
 Cost of sales 
 2005  4,879  1,426  25,920  1,326 
 2006  4,978  1,491  30,850  1,348 
 2007  5,869  1,570  33,667  1,400 
 2008  6,651  1,749  39,261  1,434 
 2009  7,175  1,882  38,690  1,748 
 2010  7,918  1,829  37,919  1,721 
 2011  8,134  1,937  40,768  2,029 
 SG&A expenses 
 2005  9,180  3,998  18,010  3,962 
 2006  10,163  4,066  21,278  3,926 
 2007  11,985  4,512  24,180  4,160 
 2008  13,314  5,103  24,017  4,604 
 2009  13,529  5,024  22,630  4,769 
 2010  14,932  5,177  24,998  4,661 
 2011  15,567  5,784  25,973  5,503 
 Net profi t 
 2005  2,454  406  7,257  128 
 2006  2,588  325  8,684  216 
 2007  3,640  449  10,340  311 
 2008  2,865  474  12,075  194 
 2009  2,495  218  13,436  197 
 2010  3,116  478  12,736  362 
 2011  3,393  701  11,797  154 
 Source : S&P Compustat Database (global version) 
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presence in China by acquiring the mass-market “Mininurse” brand, which had 
280,000 sales outlets for its cosmetics in bulk retailers and other channels. 
 The Chinese cosmetics market is concentrated along coastal regions such as 
Shanghai, accounting for 90 % of cosmetic sales in China. Western cosmetic manu-
facturers spend vast sums on advertising centered on large cities, promoting their 
brands in sales channels such as department stores, drugstores, supermarkets, 
hypermarkets (stores that combine supermarkets and department stores), and gen-
eral stores. For example, in 2004, P&G bid the highest price to advertise during 
China’s Central Television’s prime time. 
 However, in September 2006, products in the SK II lineup (owned by P&G’s 
Max Factor) were found to have banned substances in them, forcing the company to 
accept returns and halt further sales. This incident stemmed from chromium and 
neodymium, the use of which is banned in China, being detected in nine SK-II 
 Table 10.9  Shares of global cosmetic manufacturers in global market (%) 
 Company  Country  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
 Procter & Gamble  USA  8.9  12.9  12.1  12.0  11.8  11.7  11.6  11.4 
 L’oreal Group  France  9.7  9.7  9.8  10.0  10.2  10.0  9.7  9.7 
 Unilever Group  UK  7.5  7.1  6.4  6.4  6.4  6.5  7.1  7.7 
 Colgate-Palmolive  USA  3.9  3.9  3.6  3.7  3.7  3.6  3.7  3.8 
 Avon Products  USA  3.3  3.3  3.0  3.1  3.2  3.3  3.3  3.2 
 Beierdorf AG  Germany  2.9  3.0  2.9  3.2  3.3  3.3  3.2  3.1 
 Estee Lauder Cos  USA  3.9  3.8  3.4  3.2  3.1  3.0  2.9  2.9 
 Johnson & Johnson  USA  2.0  2.1  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.8 
 Shiseido Co  JP  2.8  2.7  2.4  2.3  2.3  2.4  2.5  2.5 
 Kao  JP  1.6  1.6  2.3  2.0  2.0  2.2  2.1  2.1 
 Source : Euromonitor International ( 2011 ) 
 Table 10.10  Shares of global cosmetic manufacturers in Chinese market (%) 
 Company  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
 Procter & Gamble (Guangzhou)  16.7  18.0  19.0  18.4  17.3  16.7  16.4  15.9 
 L’oreal China  6.2  6.8  7.0  8.1  9.2  9.8  10.5  11.0 
 Shiseido Liyuan Cosmetics  2.4  2.6  3.8  4.4  4.7  5.0  5.3  5.4 
 Unilever China Ltd  6.2  6.2  4.7  4.3  4.5  4.4  4.4  4.5 
 Amway (China)  5.8  5.1  3.7  3.6  4.1  4.3  4.0  3.9 
 Colgate (Guangzhou)  3.8  3.5  3.8  3.6  3.5  3.4  3.4  3.4 
 Hangzhou Mary Kay Cosmetics  1.5  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.4  2.9  3.1  3.2 
 Beiersdorf AG  0.8  2.9  3.0  3.1  3.1  2.9 
 Johnson & Johnson China  1.9  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.9  2.6  2.5  2.4 
 Estee Lauder  0.7  0.9  1.1  1.4  1.6  1.8 
 Avon (China)  3.8  3.4  2.8  3.1  3.0  2.7  1.6  1.1 
 C-Bons Group  2.2  2.0  1.6  –  –  –  –  – 
 Source : Euromonitor International ( 2011 ) 
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products, resulting in directions from the Chinese General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (ASQIQ) to quarantine products imported 
from Japan (SK-II was originally a sub-brand of Japan’s Max Factor that was 
acquired by P products sold in China under this brand were thus imported from 
Japan). Finally, the Chinese government issued a statement that the chromium and 
neodymium detected in these products were originally in the products’ raw materi-
als, posing no threat to the human body. Still, the damage was done on SK-II’s 
brand image. After the Chinese government’s directives were issued that September, 
there were incidents of refund-seeking consumers causing damage to certain stores, 
and the media calling P&G, which did not respond to requests for refunds, a 
“Bàwáng,” or tyrant of the worst kind, which caused further problems. 
 This displays the necessity of heeding unforeseen risks caused by governments. 
Quality inspections on imported cosmetics have recently become more stringent, 
and as a result, new product introductions into the Chinese market are said to be 
substantially behind schedule. The fault also lies with the complexity of permits and 
licensing systems. Counterfeit goods are also a source of trouble for manufacturers. 
Shiseido has contracted with multiple law fi rms and to gather information regarding 
counterfeit products. After gaining suffi cient numbers, it contacts the appropriate 
bureaucrats and government agencies, thereby seizing counterfeit manufactured 
products. 
 Despite the Chinese market’s many issues, its scale as the world’s largest cos-
metics market is also expanding rapidly. Shiseido perceives the Chinese market as a 
pillar of its overseas strategy and is in the process of securing itself as a global cos-
metics manufacturer representing Asia, while confronting the risks posed by China. 
Competing with western megabrands in the Chinese market can be perceived as a 
preliminary battle for business in other emerging nations, where much future growth 
in new cosmetics markets is expected. 
10.7  Significance of This Case Study and Suggested 
Questions 
 This case study describes Shiseido’s business in China from the 1980s, focusing 
particularly on the company’s marketing strategy. Shiseido entered the Chinese 
market at the behest of the Beijing government and expanded its market by modify-
ing its marketing strategy in response to changes in the marketplace. Shiseido’s fi rst 
success in China came from the AUPRES brand, exclusively developed for that 
market. Because it was produced in China, it would have been more benefi cial for 
the company to increase its number of retail outlets as much as possible to keep fac-
tory utilization high. Instead, it limited its channel growth to establish its image as 
a high-end brand. The company clearly differentiated the AUPRES brand from 
SHISEIDO, a global brand popular among the wealthy, and developed products in 
the middle segment between high-end imported products and cheap domestic 
products. 
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 However, P&G, Estée Lauder, Lancôme, and other powerful foreign brands have 
also entered the market, making competition more intense. SHC is increasing its 
product line and executing marketing strategies for each product level. Unlike the 
western cosmetic manufacturers, Shiseido has developed its own unique channel in 
the form of specialty shops and aims to reach a wide range of consumers. It is a 
business model developed in Japan that has been imported to China. Additionally, 
Shiseido has recently begun selling its products in drugstores and over the Internet, 
increasing its products’ reach and distribution channels. 
 Using this case study, the following questions can be considered to further 
deepen the understanding of global strategy.
•  Compared with Europe and the US, what are the merits and demerits of Shiseido 
expanding its cosmetics business in China? From Japan’s perspective, is the gap 
between the Chinese and western markets, as described by the CAGE frame-
work, larger than that between the cosmetics markets in China and Japan? 
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•  Describe the marketing strategy for one of Shiseido’s products in China. How are 
customers segmented and how does Shiseido view its target customers? Describe 
the four Ps (product, price, place, and promotion) of marketing as they apply to 
Shiseido in China. 
•  How do Shiseido’s marketing strategies differ from other large players in the 
Chinese market (L’oréal, P&G, etc.)? As competition becomes more intense in 
the Chinese market, should Shiseido continue down the same path? 
•  Shiseido aims to be a “global player representing Asia,” and seems to be follow-
ing a strategy that differentiates itself from large western players. Looking into 
global market trends over the next 5–10 years, do you think this strategy of dif-
ferentiation is appropriate? 
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